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Abstract 
Motivated reasoning is an important element of politics especially in these highly po-
larized times. People selectively expose themselves to information in a fashion that 
makes it possible to embrace arguments consistent with their existing biases and ig-
nore arguments inconsistent with those biases. Often overlooked in the research on 
motivated reasoning and selective exposure to information, however, is that a substan-
tial portion of politics is about affective responses—that which makes people feel good 
and that which makes people feel bad. In this paper, we introduce a novel indicator of 
people’s tendency to prolong exposure to favored political images or to truncate ex-
posure to disliked political images. This measure makes it possible to better under-
stand individual differences regarding concepts such as negativity bias and asymmet-
ric political attention even when substantive, issue-based information is not at play. 
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Research consistently demonstrates that people engage in motivated reasoning, in part by selectively exposing themselves to information 
and arguments consistent with their pre-existing biases while minimiz-
ing exposure to inconsistent information and arguments (Leeper & Mull-
inix, 2018). Research also demonstrates that politics is about affect— the 
feelings and emotions produced by a given stimulus (Crigler & Hevron, 
2017). Indeed, Lodge and Taber (2013) suggest that every politically 
relevant stimulus carries an affective tag, and this affective tag on polit-
ical leaders, groups, and issues is automatic in nature (Lodge & Taber, 
2005) and provides an underlying motivation for cognitive and behav-
ioral responses to any given political stimulus. 
Selective exposure is broadly assumed to be concerned with the de-
gree to which people are and are not open to substantive information 
(Hart et al., 2009). Left unclear is the degree to which selective exposure 
is influenced by affect. Do people screen stimuli that are affective but de-
void of political issue-based content in the same way they screen infor-
mation that is more substantive and policy-driven? If they do, much of 
what appears to be motivated reasoning may actually be motivated view-
ing, (i.e. an approach/avoid behavioral or cognitive response anchored 
in an automatic affective response to a visual stimulus). 
If, in addition to being motivated reasoners, people are also moti-
vated viewers, efforts to improve the polity by disseminating balanced 
and objective information are likely to be less successful than antici-
pated. Accordingly, our objective here is to investigate how much effort 
people are willing to expend to view non-informational political mate-
rial they favor and to remove non-informational political material they 
dislike. We do so primarily by introducing an adapted measure of effort 
made to alter exposure to political stimuli. 
1. Measuring selective exposure to political content 
Festinger’s (1957) influential work on cognitive dissonance set the 
stage for analyses of selective exposure, which has been defined as “the 
tendency to craft an information environment that reflects one’s politi-
cal beliefs” (Garrett, 2009, 677). This is important because exposure to 
different and opposing views is intimately connected to democracy and 
to tolerance (see, for example, Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Huckfeldt, 
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Johnson & Sprague, 2004; Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson & Ander-
son, 2010; Mutz, 2002, 2006; Sunstein, 2001). 
An important dispute has arisen over the two elements of selective 
exposure: seeking confirmatory information and avoiding disconfirma-
tory information. Are people as likely to engage in challenge avoidance 
as they are to engage in reinforcement seeking? The extensive litera-
tures on approach and avoidance behavior (Feltman & Elliot, 2012; Lee 
et al., 2015), regulatory focus theory (Brockner & Higgins, 2001), and 
loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Kim et al., 2010) suggest that 
challenge avoidance will be the stronger tendency. Yet, several studies on 
selective exposure find less evidence of challenge avoidance even while 
confirming that people seek confirming information (Frey, 1986; Gar-
rett, 2009). The explanation for this finding harkens back to Festinger’s 
(1957) point that, while opinion reinforcing information makes people 
feel good, opinion-challenging information, even if negatively valenced, 
still provides information and is unlikely to be completely avoided. Ad-
ditionally, recent research has demonstrated that there is a great deal of 
variation in negativity bias (Soroka, Fournier, Nir & Hibbing, 2019), but 
much of the negativity bias literature fails to provide alternatives to at-
tention – such as ways to avoid the negative or displeasing information, 
images, videos, or other stimuli. 
Another heavily researched topic is individual-level variation in the 
tendency to engage in selective exposure. Partisan and ideological dif-
ferences seem to play a role (Gerber, Huber, Doherty & Dowling, 2012; 
Jost & Amodio 2012), and those with more intense or extreme political 
beliefs appear to be most prone to engage in selective exposure (Feld-
man, Stroud, Bimber & Wojcieszak, 2013). Electoral context has also 
been shown to influence the degree to which partisanship influences se-
lective exposure (Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012). 
We focus here on the motivations that drive selective exposure. Given 
the tribal nature of modern American politics, it may be that, informa-
tion aside, people engage in selective exposure out of a desire to expose 
themselves to fellow partisans while minimizing their exposure to those 
they find distasteful. People may not be seeking an imbalanced informa-
tional environment so much as they are maneuvering toward affectively 
pleasing situations and experiences and/or away from affectively dis-
pleasing situations and experiences. 
To explore the many issues surrounding affective selective exposure, 
we need a measure that possesses several qualities. First, given people’s 
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well-known tendency to put a favorable spin on their behaviors, a be-
havioral rather than self-report measure is needed. Second, the measure 
must allow us to separately identify desires to prolong exposure to stim-
uli with positive affect from desires to minimize exposure to stimuli that 
are unpalatable. Third, the measure should tap into the effort people are 
willing to expend in prolonging or truncating exposure. Merely providing 
participants the opportunity to select the content they want to see and 
not see, as standard measurement approaches do, does not tell the full 
story as people often are in a position where they must take action in or-
der to minimize their exposure to disliked political stimuli – whether it 
be navigating away from a website or reporting disliked advertisements 
on social media. Echo chamber effects may not fully account for a realis-
tic, multiple media environment (Dubois & Blank, 2018) in which peo-
ple are consistently presented with information they find pleasing and 
displeasing. Therefore, a measure not centered on choice, but rather in 
the effort people expend to navigate toward or away from content they 
want to see and not see is needed. Fourth, the measure should be able 
to identify selective exposure when overt, issue-based information is 
not in play. Finally, the measure should be subject to reasonable con-
trols and manipulations. We believe there is a measure of effort, devel-
oped by Kim et al. (2010) and called the keypress task, which meets the 
aforementioned demands (alternative measurement strategies are de-
scribed in DiMaggio & Sato, 2003; Holtzman, Schott, Jones, Balota & Yar-
koni, 2011; Marquart, Matthes & Rapp, 2016). 
Our adaptation of the keypress task to test for selective political ex-
posure worked as follows. Subsequent to granting informed consent, 
participants were brought into a laboratory setting and instructed that 
they would encounter a series of images on a computer screen over the 
course of twenty minutes. All participants were shown the same 72 im-
ages and the images and blocks were randomized. Similar to Kim et al. 
(2010), participants were instructed that they would see a flash of the 
upcoming image (200 ms), followed, in order, by a 1.8 s focal point, a dis-
played image with a default time of 8 s, and a 1.5 s black screen between 
each image. The display time was adjusted to account for both the com-
plexity of the images, and the degree to which pilot tests found their ef-
fort to extend or truncate viewing rewarding. This process repeated un-
til the twenty minutes was over. 
If the participant opted to press no keys, each image remained on 
the screen for eight seconds. To get the image to disappear before 8 s 
Wa r r e n  e t  a l .  i n  P e r s o n a l i t y  a n d  I n d i v i d ua l  D i f f e r e n c e s  1 5 5  ( 2 0 2 0 )      5
elapsed, the participant needed to alternate pressing keys “X” and “M” 
on the keyboard. Each key sequence pressed reduced the display time 
of the image by a small fraction of a second, such that the absolute min-
imum amount of time the image could be seen was four seconds. If the 
participant wanted to keep the image on the screen longer than the de-
fault 8 s, keys “S” and “K” had to be pressed in an alternating fashion, 
which added a small fraction of a second for each press. The maximum 
view time possible was twelve seconds. 
Participants encountered four blocks of images (political actors, po-
litical issue images, positive and negative images, and pleasing and dis-
pleasing faces), but only two blocks are used for this project: political 
actors and generic (that is, non-political) positive and negative images. 
The generic positive and negative images were obtained from the In-
ternational Affective Picture System (IAPS) and were selected based on 
their mean arousal and mean valence pre-rated scores (Lang, Bradley 
& Cuthbert, 1997). Unlike the generic images, the valence of political 
images will depend on the partisan and ideological affinities of the in-
dividuals viewing the images. We selected images of prominent Demo-
crat and Republican politicians and assumed that Democrats would be 
more likely to view favorably images of Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama 
and Bernie Sanders and to view unfavorably images of Donald Trump, 
Ted Cruz, and Mitch McConnell; Republicans, the opposite. 
Following the keypress task, participants were shown each image 
again and asked to report their valence and arousal. Additionally, par-
ticipants were asked to report whether they recognized each politician 
and whether s/he was a Republican or Democrat. Participants were then 
asked to answer a series of survey items capturing their demographic 
traits, ideological and partisan identifications, and policy preferences on 
salient issues. Psychological batteries in the survey included a measure 
of risk-taking tendencies, the Big 5 personality traits (DeYoung, Quilty 
& Peterson, 2007), and behavioral inhibition/behavioral activation sys-
tems (Carver & White, 1994). 
For each image presented, the primary variable is the amount of ef-
fort expended to either prolong or shorten exposure, operationalized as 
the number of “S-K” keypresses minus the number of “X-M” keypresses 
during viewing of the image in question. Positive values indicate an over-
all effort to prolong viewing of the image; negative values an overall ef-
fort to shorten exposure to the image. (Programming syntax for the key-
press task is available to interested scholars who contact the authors.) 
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2. Hypotheses 
Drawing on cognitive dissonance theory and following the findings 
of Kim et al. (2010) we hypothesize that participants will expend effort 
to prolong exposure to images they view positively and will also expend 
effort to truncate exposure to images they view negatively. As the exten-
sive literature on negativity bias suggests, however, these two tendencies 
may not be symmetrical (see Peeters & Czapinski, 1990); however, neg-
ativity bias is universal and individual variation in negativity bias exists 
(Soroka et al., 2019). Traditional conceptualizations of negativity bias 
would expect people to maintain exposure of negative images, perhaps 
as a way of exerting vigilance. However, we believe that by providing par-
ticipants with a way to escape the negative, they will be more likely to do 
so. Recent research has demonstrated that when provided alternatives, 
dwell time viewing negative images is lessened (Oosterhoff, Shook & 
Ford, 2018). Thus, we expect that, on balance, people will expend more 
effort to remove the negative than they will to prolong the positive. Par-
ticipants are likely to display political tribalism by prolonging viewing 
of “own party” images and, to an even greater degree, truncating view-
ing of “other party” images. We also hypothesize that patterns of effort 
in the face of generic images will parallel those found for political im-
ages and that people’s self-reported responses to positive and negative 
stimuli will correlate with their willingness to expend effort to prolong 
or shorten exposure to those particular stimuli. 
Several other hypotheses address individual variation. Distinct psy-
chological orientations are likely to lead to important differences in how 
the participants interact with the political environment. For example, 
psychologists have long recognized the important distinction between 
approach and avoidance behaviors (Feltman & Elliot, 2012), and these 
differences have been measured with a validated battery that distin-
guishes between people oriented toward making good things happen as 
opposed to keeping bad things from happening (Carver & White, 1994). 
These same distinct tendencies are likely to be on display in the political 
realm with some individuals driven primarily by the desire to view pre-
ferred candidates and parties and others driven primarily by the desire 
to defeat disliked candidates and parties. We hypothesize that individu-
als who are approach oriented will work harder to prolong exposure to 
favorable images and that individuals who are inhibition oriented will 
work harder at truncating exposure to unfavorable images. 
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The survey also included the short version of the Big Five Personal-
ity battery (TIPI). We have no clear expectations for any relationship 
between openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, or 
neuroticism and the various measures of effort. However, as research 
has demonstrated, such individual-level differences are likely to influ-
ence political orientation (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling & Ha, 2010; 
Mondak et al., 2010) and intensity of political identification (Gerber et 
al., 2012; see also Bakker, Hopmann & Persson, 2015 for review); there-
fore, we expect that these factors may also impact the degree to which 
individuals exert effort, particularly for political stimuli. Given that pre-
vious research has demonstrated the effect of personality traits on in-
formation receiving and political behavior, we believe that exploration 
of personality in relation to task behaviors are of interest and pertinent 
to understanding individual variation in keypress behavior. 
Similarly, individual variation in the degree to which people are likely 
to approach or avoid various types of information should be considered; 
therefore, we include measures of behavioral approach and avoidance, 
as is captured by inclusion of the Behavioral Inhibition Scale/Behavioral 
Activation Scale (BIS/BAS). Examination of variation on approach and 
avoidance may provide additional context to understanding whether cer-
tain types of people may be more likely to engage in motivated viewing. 
The standard array of demographics is available as controls. 
The variables of most interest, however, are those pertaining to po-
litical beliefs and behaviors. Asymmetry between those on the left and 
those on the right is a salient topic of late. Previous literature suggests 
that, relative to liberals, conservatives tend to have a stronger negativ-
ity bias (Oxley et al., 2008; Shook & Fazio, 2009). This finding supports 
the hypothesis that conservatives will expend more effort to minimize 
their exposure to unfavorable images. 
Moreover, any ideological pattern in keypress behavior should not nec-
essarily be expected to apply equally in the generic as well as the political 
realm. Previous research consistently finds that motivated reasoning, in-
tolerance, and dislike for the other side is just as palpable among liberals 
as it is among conservatives (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford & Weth-
erell, 2014; Crawford, Modri & Motyl, 2013). As such, those on the left and 
those on the right should be roughly equal in their willingness to exert ef-
fort to prolong viewing of their own side’s politicians and to shorten view-
ing of politicians belonging to the other side even as those on the political 
right may be more likely to avoid displeasing generic images. 
Wa r r e n  e t  a l .  i n  P e r s o n a l i t y  a n d  I n d i v i d ua l  D i f f e r e n c e s  1 5 5  ( 2 0 2 0 )      8
Ideological asymmetries aside, we hypothesize a positive correlation 
between extremity of political beliefs and effort in response to the po-
litical images, especially the “other party” images. Political orientations 
more distant from the ideological center should be accompanied by a 
desire to make the politically undesirable go away and, to a lesser ex-
tent, by the desire to make the politically desirable stay longer. If we are 
correct and the people most prone to extreme political beliefs are also 
more inclined to fixate on the opposition, this might help to explain the 
salient role of the negative in the political arena and news concerning it 
(Soroka & McAdams, 2015). 
3. Results 
All participants consented to participate in the study in accordance 
with the guidelines of the Institutional Review Board of [institution]. Our 
sample consisted of 130 students enrolled in introductory-level politi-
cal science classes in March of 2018. 
Summaries of the keypress behavior of the participants are presented 
in Fig. 1. (We replicated these general patterns in a smaller student sam-
ple, where students completed the same task a year later, and these re-
sults are presented in the appendix to provide evidence of the stability of 
the findings). Here we see the mean effort participants made to keep the 
generic pleasant images on the screen and the mean effort participants 
made to abbreviate exposure to the unpleasant images. As expected, par-
ticipants worked to lengthen exposure to generic positive images (e.g., a 
beautiful sunset) and worked to lessen exposure to generic unpleasant 
images (e.g., a used toilet). The mean activity to prolong positively rated 
images was 4.2 keypresses per second while the mean absolute value of 
activity to remove negatively rated images was 5.7 keypresses per sec-
ond (p < .01, two-tailed t-test using absolute values). 
Moving to the political images, we showed participants the images 
of 15 political figures, 8 Republicans, including two images of Donald 
Trump, and 7 Democrats, including two images of Hillary Clinton. In Ta-
ble 1, we present the keypress activity engaged in by Democratic par-
ticipants and Republican participants while they viewed the 17 images 
of politicians. To provide context, we also present the percent of partici-
pants (Republican and Democrats combined) who claimed to recognize 
each of the images. 
Wa r r e n  e t  a l .  i n  P e r s o n a l i t y  a n d  I n d i v i d ua l  D i f f e r e n c e s  1 5 5  ( 2 0 2 0 )      9
The 55 Republican participants worked hardest to remove the two 
images of Hillary Clinton followed by Bill Clinton, Bernie Sanders, 
and Nancy Pelosi. On the other hand, they did not make much effort 
to shorten their exposure to Joe Biden and they were actually slightly 
more likely to prolong than to shorten their viewing of the images of 
both Barack and Michelle Obama. These same Republican participants 
made efforts to prolong viewing of nearly all of the Republican images, 
including Melania Trump, John McCain, Ted Cruz, Donald Trump, Mike 
Pence, George W. Bush, and Paul Ryan. One Republican political figure 
was an exception to the overall pattern: Republican participants were 
slightly more likely to work to make Mitch McConnell’s image go away 
than to stay on the screen. 
Turning to the 75 Democratic participants, they were most eager to 
shorten exposure to Donald Trump followed by Mike Pence and Ted 
Cruz. Images of Mitch McConnell, Paul Ryan and Melania Trump gener-
ated only modest effort to shorten exposure and images of George W. 
Fig. 1. Keypress activity during viewing of positive and negative generic images. 
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Bush and John McCain generated very little activity from Democratic par-
ticipants. In terms of the images Democrats worked to prolong, Barack 
and Michelle Obama topped with Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden follow-
ing. Hillary Clinton was well down the list and Democratic participants 
made no effort to extend exposure to Bill Clinton. 
Table 1 also contains information on the degree to which the partic-
ipants in our study (Democrats and Republican combined) claimed to 
recognize these 15 political figures. Since we did not want behaviors in-
fluenced by political images that were less than completely familiar to 
the respondents, the remainder of our analyses will focus on only the 
four Republican political figures (George W. Bush, Melania Trump, and 
Donald Trump twice) and the four Democratic political figures (Barack 
Obama, Michelle Obama, and Hillary Clinton twice) who were recognized 
by at least 97% of the respondents. 
For each participant, we averaged keypress activity for the four po-
litical figures of their own and for the four of the other political party 
and the results are presented in the first two bars of Fig. 2. They show 
Table 1 Mean keypresses to prolong (positive valence) or shorten (negative valence) 
exposures to images of politicians by participant partisanship. 
Democrat political actors         Republican         Democrat             Recognition(%) 
Hillary Clinton2 (D)  −32.273  12.667  99% 
Hillary Clinton1 (D)  −31.618  16.693  99% 
Bill Clinton (D)  −20.873  0.013  93% 
Bernie Sanders (D)  −17.927  37.133  94% 
Nancy Pelosi (D)  −13.418  6.853  51% 
Joe Biden (D)  −1.927  24.493  80% 
Barack Obama (D)  1.745  53.76  100% 
Michelle Obama (D)  4.109  55.013  99% 
Republican Political Actors      Republican         Democrat               Recognition(%)
Donald Trump1 (R)  19.2  −29.707  100% 
Donald Trump2 (R)  16.291  −27,747  99% 
Mike Pence (R)  20  −25.133  86% 
Ted Cruz (R)  15.8  −23.52  90% 
Mitch McConnell (R)  −1.982  −14.347  33% 
Paul Ryan (R)  33.927  −13.347  80% 
Melania Trump (R)  13.473 −10.547  99% 
Gw Bush (R)  25.436  −6.627  97% 
John McCain (R)  15.418  −2.293  84% 
 N = 55  N = 75  N = 130 
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that on average participants made an effort to prolong viewing of po-
litical figures of their own party (an average of 3.5 keypresses per sec-
ond of viewing) and that they also made an effort to shorten exposure 
to political figures of the opposing political party (an average of 3.9 key-
presses per second of viewing). The difference between these two figure 
types is not statistically significant (p = .20) thus suggesting that nega-
tive political stimuli elicit a similar amount of effort as positive stimuli. 
Remember, however, that the communication literature indicates peo-
ple are more likely to embrace positive information than to avoid nega-
tive information (Garrett, 2009; 2013). It may be the case, however, that 
when no new information is available (as was true for our participants 
since they were only looking at facial images) people are freed from the 
feeling that they should pay more attention to the other side in hopes 
of garnering information. 
Fig. 2 also presents the results broken down by party and here we 
find that, compared to Republican participants, Democratic participants 
made more of an effort to prolong exposure to political figures of their 
political party and that they also made more of an effort to shorten ex-
posure to political figures of the opposing political party. Note, how-
ever, that these differences did not achieve statistical significance and 
are produced by images that are not perfectly balanced across parties 
(it appears the Obamas were particularly appealing to this undergrad-
uate sample, regardless of their party identification). 
Fig. 2. Keypress activity during viewing images of politicians. 
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Moving to individual-level analyses, we first calculated each partic-
ipant’s mean effort with regard to generic images (10 positive and 10 
negative) and mean effort with regard to the images of political figures 
(4 own-party and 4 other-party). These variables indicate that those 
participants making the most effort to prolong their viewing of positive 
generic images also exerted the most effort to shorten viewing of a neg-
ative generic image (r = −0.44; p < .01). A similar pattern was observed 
for images of own-party and other-party political figures (r = −0.53; p < 
.01). Moreover, keypress activity to prolong viewing images that are ge-
nerically positive correlates with keypress activity to prolong viewing 
images that are politically positive (i.e., own-party political figures) at 
0.47 (p < .01) and keypress activity to shorten exposure to images that 
are generic but negative correlates with keypress activity to shorten ex-
posure to images that are politically negative (i.e., images of other-party 
political figures), albeit at a slightly weaker 0.26 (p < .01). 
Next, using participants’ self-report of the valence of their response 
to each image, we correlated the valence self-reports with effort made 
to prolong or abbreviate viewing of those same images. Keypress behav-
ior for positive generic images was correlated with the valence rating for 
the same images (r = 0.40; p < .01) and the same pattern was observed 
for negative generic images (r = 0.42; p<.01), images of own party poli-
ticians (r = 0.29; p < .01), and images of other party politicians (r = 0.60; 
p < .01). Though clearly related, the modest correlations suggest that ef-
forts to prolong or shorten exposure to images are not the same thing 
as people’s self-reported evaluations. 
Our final analysis involves identifying individual-level variables that 
might be related to the various forms of keypress effort we have been 
describing. To facilitate presentation of the results, we model them in 
an OLS regression format, fully recognizing that these are correlational 
data and permit no certainty about causal order. Explanatory variables 
include demographic, political, and psychological variables. The four 
dependent variables are keypresses in response to generic positive im-
ages, absolute value of keypresses in response to generic negative im-
ages; keypresses in response to political figures of the participant’s own 
party, and absolute value of keypresses in response to political figures 
of the opposing political party.1 
1 Residuals for each of the models were normally distributed. A post hoc power analysis indi-
cated a 99% chance of detecting an effect size larger than 0.5 and only a 20% chance of de-
tecting a small effect size of r = 0.1. 
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The demographic independent variables are family income, religios-
ity, sex (female), and race (only 19 of our 130 participants identified as 
non-white). We did not include education and age since, with a student 
sample, variation on these particular variables is minimal. The politi-
cal variables in the models are party identification (1 = Republican; 0 = 
Democrat) and ideological extremity. The latter was constructed by tab-
ulating the participant’s tendency to take “strong” positions (regardless 
Table 2 Explaining variation in keypress activity during viewing of positive and neg-
ative generic and political images. 
 Positive   Negative   Positive   Negative  
Dependent variable: generic generic political political 
Income  −0.014  −0.004  −0.032    =0.119* 
 (0.043)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.071) 
Religiosity  0.116  0.004  −0.077  −0.116 
 (0.177)  (0.209)  (0.225)  (0.293) 
Female  −0.082  0.529  0.170  0.635 
 (0.412)  (0.487)  (0.524)  (0.682) 
White  0.812  0.121  1.221*  0.5465 
 (0.493)  (0.582)  (0.627)  (0.814) 
Republicans  0.517  1.070**  0.254  0.782 
 (0.418)  (0.493)  (0.531)  (0.690) 
Ideological Extremity  0.553*  0.353  0.911**  1.388*** 
 (0.281)  (0.332)  (0.357)  (0.465) 
Extraversion  0.077  0.221  0.187  −0.050 
 (0.116)  (0.137)  (0.148)  (0.192) 
Agreeableness  0.492***  0.204  0.267  0.074 
 (0.161)  (0.137)  (0.205)  (0.267) 
Emotional Stability  −0.128  −0.146  −0.312  0.027 
 (0.163)  (0.192)  (0.207)  (0.269) 
Openness  −0.239  −0.004  −0.329  0.012 
 (0.182)  (0.215)  (0.231)  (0.300) 
Conscientiousness  0.078  0.228  0.360*  0.346 
 (0.169)  (0.200)  (0.215)  (0.280) 
BIS  0.124  0.409*  −0.354  −0.302 
 (0.202)  (0.238)  (0.256)  (0.333) 
BAS  0.469*  −0.258  0.188  −0.060 
 (0.272)  (0.321)  (0.346)  (0.450) 
Constant  −1.573  1.485  1.713  2.349 
 (2.090)  (2.468)  (2.657)  (3.545) 
Observation  128  128  128  128 
R2  0.172  0.180  0.155  0.139 
Adjusted R2  0.077  0.086  0.059  0.041 
* p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001 
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of direction) on 25 political issues. We included two psychological bat-
teries in the models. The first is the 10- item TIPI battery that taps the 
Big 5 personality constructs and the second is the well-known BIS/BAS 
24 item battery. 
The results show that remarkably few of these variables are signifi-
cant predictors of keypress effort. Starting with effort in response to ge-
neric positive images (column 1), only issue extremity and behavioral ac-
tivation (BAS) have marginal effects (p < .10) and only agreeableness has 
a solid effect (p < .05). The model for keypress effort to shorten viewing 
of generic negative images does no better. As might have been expected 
with a shift from positive to negative, the behavioral activation variable 
drops out and behavioral inhibition is instead marginally related (p < 
.10). The only variable in this model that is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level is identification with the Republican Party. Compared to Dem-
ocrats, Republican participants made more effort to minimize exposure 
to negative generic stimuli. 
The models dealing with effort to prolong viewing of own-party po-
litical figures (column 3) and to shorten viewing of other-party political 
figures (column 4)—are similarly underspecified. The only significant 
variable in both Models 3 and 4 is issue extremity. The positive sign in-
dicates that greater issue position strength is typically accompanied by 
greater effort to prolong viewing of own-party political figures. Interest-
ingly, the effect for effort to minimize exposure to other party images is 
nearly a third larger, suggesting that as issue positions move from the 
center, the desire to minimize exposure to the opposing party goes up 
faster that the desire to maximize exposure to their own party.2 
4. Conclusion 
The keypress measure introduced above is not perfectly reflective 
of real-world situations, but it does allow individuals to either main-
tain or navigate away from political images just as they are able to do 
through on-line media sources. The ubiquity of politics within social me-
dia platforms makes it more important to understand the amount of ef-
fort people are willing to expend to engage in motivated viewing. This 
2 We tested the issue extremity by partisanship interaction for each of the models. The interaction 
was insignificant in all four models (p > .39). 
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continuous, controllable measure of effort makes it possible to sepa-
rate reinforcement seeking from challenge avoidance behaviors, just as 
it makes it possible to remove affective content from policy information. 
Our analysis using this measure finds those with strong positions on var-
ious political issues tend to be more eager to diminish their exposure to 
political opponents than to increase their exposure to fellow partisans. 
The fact that the focus of those with strong political beliefs shifts to the 
opposing side could be an important contributing factor to political po-
larization and acrimony. 
Still, the larger message here is that people are not merely engag-
ing in selective exposure because of informational concerns. They do 
it because they want to. Previous research using substantive informa-
tion finds that reinforcement seeking is a stronger force than challenge 
avoidance (Garrett, 2009). Our results using only still images and not 
substantive information suggest that, if anything, the desire to avoid the 
politically negative is equal to the desire to be exposed to the positive. 
If generalizable, this finding suggests that selective exposure in the 
political realm is about much more than shaping information environ-
ments. When people have no appreciable opportunity to glean substan-
tive information from political content, they still expend effort to prolong 
their exposure to images consistent with their biases and to minimize 
their exposure to those on the other side of the political arena. Since 
there is no opportunity for contravening information, people’s tendency 
to engage in affective selective exposure takes on a life of its own, fur-
ther degrading political interactions. 
Supplementary materials 
Supplementary material follows the References.
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1 Replication Student Sample Description
A second student sample consisted of 105 students enrolled in introductory-level political science classes in
Spring of 2019. Participants in the second sample completed the same task as those in first student sample
reported in manuscript. Results from the second student sample are presented below (Tables S2 to S4 and
Figures 1 and 2) and reveal a pattern consistent with the results from the first student sample reported in
the manuscript.
2 Tables
Table S1: Student Sample: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Positive Generic Keypresses* 137 4.170 1.978 0.087 2.646 5.790 8.325
Negative Generic Keypresses** 137 5.729 2.275 0.190 4.189 7.470 10.033
Income 137 8.956 4.213 1.000 6.000 12.000 15.000
Religiosity 138 2.435 1.107 1 2 3 4
Female 138 0.565 0.498 0 0 1 1
White 136 0.853 0.355 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Ideological Extremity 138 0.919 0.670 0.000 0.360 1.350 2.680
Extraversion 138 4.301 1.622 1 3.5 5.5 7
Agreeableness 138 4.692 1.129 1 4 5.5 7
Emotional Stability 138 4.696 1.351 1 4 6 7
Openness 138 5.228 1.113 2.000 4.500 6.000 7.000
Conscientiousness 138 5.572 1.087 2.500 5.000 6.500 7.000
BIS 138 4.711 1.096 2.000 4.000 5.500 7.000
BAS 138 5.185 0.733 3.308 4.635 5.692 7.000
Note: * = per second; ** = per second absolute value height
Table S2: Second Student Sample: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Positive Generic Keypresses* 105 2.996 2.092 0.000 1.199 4.813 6.700
Negative Generic Keypresses** 105 4.705 2.509 0.013 3.039 6.707 9.471
Income 103 8.709 4.528 1.000 5.000 12.000 15.000
Religiosity 105 2.219 1.168 1 1 3 4
Female 105 0.438 0.499 0 0 1 1
White 105 0.743 0.439 0 0 1 1
Ideological Extremity 83 0.889 0.653 0.000 0.408 1.240 2.640
Extraversion 82 4.341 1.474 1.000 3.500 5.500 7.000
Agreeableness 82 4.695 1.196 1.500 4.000 5.500 7.000
Emotional Stability 82 4.835 1.315 1.500 4.000 6.000 7.000
Openness 82 5.226 1.240 2.000 4.500 6.000 7.000
Conscientiousness 82 4.884 1.268 2.000 4.000 6.000 7.000
BIS 74 4.687 0.999 1.500 4.167 5.333 6.667
BAS 74 5.249 0.742 3.308 4.769 5.846 6.769
Note: * = per second; ** = per second absolute value height
Table S3: Second Student Sample: Mean Keypresses to Prolong (Positive Valence) or Shorten (Negative
Valence) Exposures to Images of Politicians by Participant Partisanship
Political Actor Republican Democrat Recognition (%)
Hillary Clinton2 (D) -23.279 -9.230 99%
Hillary Clinton1 (D) -23.209 -4.902 99%
Bernie Sanders (D) -20.884 20.803 85%
Nancy Pelosi (D) -15.977 0.721 73%
Bill Clinton (D) -15.256 -3.361 92%
Joe Biden (D) -8.628 12.672 70%
Mitch McConnell (R) -7.186 -13.721 42%
Barack Obama (D) -2.395 35.049 100%
Michelle Obama (D) 0.209 38.902 99%
GW Bush (R) 1.419 -7.885 91%
John McCain (R) 3.698 0.754 75%
Ted Cruz (R) 4.977 -20.443 86%
Mike Pence (R) 5.488 -19.197 76%
Paul Ryan (R) 8.023 -10.607 72%
Donald Trump2 (R) 8.674 -27.754 100%
Melania Trump (R) 13.070 -14.721 98%
Donald Trump1 (R) 13.140 -28.525 100%
N = 43 N = 61 N = 104
Table S4: Second Student Sample: Correlations of Keypress Behavior and Self-Reported Valence Ratings
Prolong Keypresses - Shorten Keypresses (Generic Images) -0.52***
Prolong Keypresses - Shorten Keypresses (Images of Politicans) -0.45***
Prolong Keypresses (Positive Generic Images) - Prolong Keypresses (Images of Own-Party Politicians) 0.32***
Shorten Keypresses (Negative Generic Images) - Shorten Keypresses (Images of Other-Party Politicians) 0.15
Keypress Behavior - Valence Rating (Positive Generic Images) 0.48***
Keypress Behavior - Valence Rating (Negative Generic Images) 0.58***
Keypress Behavior - Valence Rating (Images of Own Party Politicians) 0.28***
Keypress Behavior - Valence Rating (Images of Other Party Politicians) 0.60***
Note: Negative Generic and Other-Party: p = 0.11 ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
3 Figures
Figure 1: Second Student Sample: Keypress Activity during Viewing of Positive and Negative Generic
Images
Figure 2: Second Student Sample: Keypress Activity during Viewing Images of Politicians
4 Keypress Task
The code to run the keypress task is available from the authors.
All but three of the generic images came from IAPS. Three animal images were added to the positive generic
set of images to balance the positive and generic images on mean arousal and valence. The reference numbers
for the IAPS images selected are listed below.
IAPS Image Reference Numbers:
• 1300
• 1440
• 1710
• 2071
• 5480
• 5621
• 5833
• 6260
• 6550
• 6570
• 6821
• 8200
• 9008
• 9140
• 9301
• 9320
• 9405
